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Capital-stock Valuation in Tax Cases
By O. K. Burrell
Courts are called upon to make decisions involving proper 
methods of capital-stock valuation in estate cases and cases in­
volving the determination of taxable net income. In income-tax 
cases the valuation under review is usually that of March 1, 1913. 
It is impossible, for constitutional reasons, to tax income accrued 
prior to the date at which the income-tax amendment went into 
effect—March 1, 1913. The taxable profit upon the sale of stock 
after March 1, 1913, which was acquired before March 1, 1913, is 
the difference between the selling price of the stock and its cost, or 
the difference between its selling price and its March 1, 1913, 
value, whichever is lower. The taxpayer is thus interested in 
establishing as high a March 1, 1913, value as possible. In 
estate and inheritance-tax cases the taxpayer desires as low a valu­
ation as possible, for the reason that the tax is levied upon the 
value of the estate, or upon the value of the inheritance, depend­
ing upon the jurisdiction. In both income-tax and estate cases 
involving capital-stock valuation the courts usually do not affirma­
tively fix a value upon capital stock, but undertake only to review 
the fairness and legality of methods applied by the proper officers.
Obviously it is a very difficult matter to lay down a general rule 
or method of capital-stock valuation which can be consistently 
applied in all cases. The factors that make values are so intangi­
ble and elusive that it is difficult to reduce them to a mathematical 
formula. The value of any asset, including capital stock, may be 
thought of as the anticipated future returns from the asset dis­
counted back to the present at a discount rate which is largely 
contingent upon the certainty of the future benefit. The so-
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called “pure interest rate,” or the rate which is paid for riskless 
capital, is also a factor. In a business sense, there is no motive 
for the ownership of capital assets other than the desire for future 
returns. The present value of the future income is intimately 
related to the certainty of realization of the income. If the future 
benefit in the way of income is reasonably certain, the discount 
rate used to compute present value may be low. If the future 
benefit is uncertain of realization, a very high rate of discount 
must be applied to estimate present value. It should be borne 
in mind that the higher the rate of discount applied to future 
income, the lower is the present value. Two things are necessary, 
then, in order to establish the value of an asset:
(1) An estimate of the future benefits to be obtained from 
the asset.
(2) Some idea of the rate of discount by which these future 
values may be translated into present value.
This concept of valuation as discounted future income or bene­
fit essentially coincides with the legal concept of fair market 
value. Courts are much inclined to accept evidences of actual 
sales as the basis of valuation when possible, but the price paid 
by the buyer may be presumed to be determined in large part by 
his estimate of future income. When no sale prices are available 
courts have used methods of valuation for capital stock which are 
in effect the discounting of future income. The determination of 
the rate of discount to be used and of the amount of future income 
expected is difficult. In the case of listed securities there is 
in published quotations some official record of the investing 
public’s estimate of these intangible value factors. There is, 
however, the possibility that even the published quotation of a 
stock may not be an indication of its fair market value at that 
time. The price quoted may be a result of manipulation, or it 
may represent the sale of a number of shares much smaller than 
the block of stock being valued. The block of stock under valua­
tion may represent control of the corporation, which sometimes is 
valuable quite apart from any question of the stock’s intrinsic 
value. An offer of a large number of shares for sale may be ex­
pected to depress the price. The valuation of unlisted stock which 
is closely held is a much more difficult matter. Here the court 
must pass upon methods used in determining the price that a
2
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willing buyer would be willing to pay, or a willing seller to accept, 
in view of the special circumstances. These special circumstances 
include “the earning power of the corporation, the quality of 
management, the prospects for future earnings, the proportion of 
earnings disbursed as dividends,” etc. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties involved, these intangible factors of value must be re­
duced to a definite method of valuation and that method must be 
applied to the particular situation.
When stocks are listed upon a stock exchange and quotations of 
actual sales are available, or when there is evidence of bona-fide 
sales in the case of unlisted stocks, courts are almost universally 
inclined to accept these sales figures as a proper valuation.*  
This is true even though such sales were made in quantities much 
smaller than the block of stock under valuation (Commonwealth v. 
Bingham's Administrator, 196 Ky. 318).
* See the following cases: Walker v. People, 192 Ill. 106; 61 N. E. 489; In re Smith, 76 N. Y. S. 
185; Matter of Gould, 19 App. Div. 352; 156 N. Y. 423; Matter of Chamber, 155 Supp. 153; People 
v. Coleman, 107 N. Y. 541; 14 N. E. 431; Matter of Kennedy, 155 Supp. 192; Mailer of Cook, 50 
Misc. (N. Y.) 487; Rice v. Eisner, 16 Fed. (2d series) 358; 6 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 6058, T. D.
The acceptance of actual sale figures as a basis of valuation 
seems entirely proper. The best evidence of the price a willing 
buyer would be willing to pay, or a willing seller to accept, is 
obviously the price that willing buyers and willing sellers actually 
arrive at in the market. This is the rule adopted by statute in 
New York. When quotations on a stock exchange are a result of 
“forced sales,” however, they do not constitute a proper basis of 
valuation (Walter v. Duffy, 287 Fed. 41).
When the stock under valuation is inactive or closely held the 
method is not so obvious. There seem to be two quantitative ap­
proaches to valuation in this situation. The first is the book 
value of the stock based upon an appraisal of the assets. This 
appraisal of assets may include a revaluation of existing tangible 
assets and also an estimate for goodwill, whether or not goodwill 
is entered on the books of the corporation. The second is that of 
capitalization of earnings at a rate assumed to compensate for the 
intangible factors present. As a matter of fact the two methods 
are based upon the same thing, since earning power usually forms 
the basis for the estimate of goodwill. Courts have quite gener­
ally recognized that earning power is the foundation upon which 
valuation is based and that other considerations are important 
only as they have a bearing on present or future earning power.
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This may not be entirely true in the case of the “cash asset’’ 
stocks. The book value of the capital stock of a corporation 
whose assets consist largely or entirely of cash, or assets which can 
be quickly turned into cash, represents the amount of a possible 
liquidating cash dividend. The valuation of the capital stock of a 
corporation of this type could not logically be less than liquidating 
value. The valuation figure could, of course, be greater than 
liquidating value if it appeared that the present or prospective 
earnings and dividends of the corporation were large enough to 
constitute a reasonable rate of return on the higher valuation. 
As a matter of fact, the current market prices of the leading bank 
and trust-company shares reflect valuations several times as large 
as the liquidating value of the stock of these companies. The de­
ciding factor in establishing the valuation of cash-asset stocks 
above book value must come back inevitably to present or pro­
spective earning power.
In the case of the ordinary industrial corporation, the appraisal 
of assets (except cash and cash assets) is directly related to their 
present or future capacity to produce an income. In a sense, 
then, it may be said that the valuation of capital stock from the 
book value based upon appraisal of the assets is in essence valua­
tion based upon anticipated earnings. This is particularly true 
in case the appraisal of the assets includes an appraisal of goodwill. 
Thus the court said In re estate of Dupignac (204 N. Y. S. 273):
“The method of valuation adopted by the courts is to ‘ascertain the 
cash value of the property which the shares represent, assigning to each 
share its proportionate worth.’ The book value of stock is its intrinsic 
value. If there had been no sales, the assessor must necessarily fall back 
upon the book value as the nearest approximation to the fair market value. 
In the absence of sales the book value must be taken as the basis of com­
putation. ... In arriving at the number or multiple to be used to multi­
ply the average net annual profits to ascertain the value of the goodwill, I 
have taken into consideration the yearly earnings and the earning power; 
. . . the business sales; the increased assets; the corporate existence of 36 
years; ... In the instant case, in view of all the facts, I have taken five 
years' purchase as the factor as not unreasonable nor excessive and being 
suitable and proper, having reference to the nature and character of the 
particular business under consideration.”
It is evident that the court did not use the term “book value” 
in the usually accepted business sense. Certainly few if any 
business men will agree that “the book value of stock is its in­
trinsic value.” Clearly, the actual valuation was in large part 
dependent upon earning power of the corporation because of the 
fact that earning power was taken as the basis for determining the 
cash value of the goodwill.
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In Boyd v. Heiner (5 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 6069) the valuation of 
stock was established through appraisal of the assets including 
goodwill. In this case, however, the estimate for goodwill was 
reached in a slightly different way. The average of six years’ 
earnings was first computed. From this average annual-earnings 
figure was deducted an amount equal to 8 per cent of the conceded 
value of the tangible assets on March 1, 1913. The remainder of 
the earnings were considered as attributable to goodwill and 
capitalized at 15 per cent in order to determine a value for good­
will. The estimated goodwill was then added to the conceded 
value of the tangible assets and the total was taken as the value of 
the company as a going concern.*
The unsuccessful attempt of the treasury department to assess 
additional income taxes upon the minority stockholders of the 
Ford Motor Company who sold their stock in 1919 illustrates 
very well the difficulties involved in the valuation of capital stock 
which is closely held. In brief the facts were as follows: In 1919 
certain minority stockholders in the Ford Motor Company were 
asked to sell their stock to Henry Ford and Edsel B. Ford. These 
minority stockholders had acquired their stock prior to March 1, 
1913, and it was stipulated that the cost was lower than the 
March 1, 1913, valuation. The taxable profit upon the sale 
would have been, then, the difference between the sale price and 
the March 1, 1913, valuation. For the individuals in question 
the income tax would have amounted to about two thirds of 
whatever taxable profit was realized. (The 1918 act did not pro­
vide for the taxation of capital net gain at 12½ per cent.) Hence, 
the question whether or not the offer should be accepted depended 
upon the March 1, 1913, valuation. In this situation the buyers 
of the stock applied to Daniel C. Roper, then commissioner of in­
ternal revenue, and requested official inquiry and action fixing the 
1913 valuation for the guidance of those who were asked to sell. 
Accordingly the commissioner fixed a figure of $9,489.34 per share 
as the fair 1913 value. The stock was then sold (at prices ranging 
from $12,500 per share to $13,444 per share) and the sellers in­
cluded in their 1919 returns the difference between the sale price 
and $9,489.34 per share as the taxable profit on the sale. On 
March 1, 1925, Commissioner Blair levied a further deficiency 
assessment upon the profit from the Ford stock sale upon the
* See the following cases: Matter of Valentine, 163 N. Y. App. Div. 843; 147 Supp. 1146; Matter 
of Bach, 147 N. Y. S. 289; Matter of Jones, 172 N. Y. 575; 65 N. E. 570; Matter of Laidlaw, 176 
N. Y. S. 885. 
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theory that the fair value of the stock on March 1, 1913, had been 
$2,634 per share, thus indicating an additional profit of $6,855.34 
per share. The only justification for the additional assessment, 
according to counsel for the government, was that it represented 
a “new and better view of the same facts” based upon a “matured 
and better judgment.” This 1925 deficiency assessment was 
paid, and one of the former minority stockholders, Mrs. Alice G. 
Kales, brought suit to recover and was successful. The case was 
appealed to the United States circuit court of appeals by the 
government, and here the decision of the lower court was affirmed 
(Woodworth v. Kales, 26 Fed. Rep. [2d series] 178). Another of 
the former minority stockholders, James Couzens, United States 
senator from Michigan, took his case before the board of tax ap­
peals. This body decided that the government had the right to 
reopen the question of the March 1, 1913, value of the stock, but 
that the commissioner was in error in his revision of the valuation. 
The board decided that the fair value of the capital stock of the 
Ford Motor Company, on March 1, 1913, was $10,000 per share. 
This was in effect a victory for Mr. Couzens (James Couzens v. 
Commissioner, 11 B. T. A. 1040). The government recently an­
nounced that neither the case of Mrs. Kales nor the case of Mr. 
Couzens would be appealed further. In both cases the main 
issue was the fair value, on March 1, 1913, of the capital stock of 
the Ford Motor Company.
The available facts upon which the valuation was based were 
concerned with the earnings of the Ford Motor Company in the 
years prior to 1913, and the future growth of the concern that was 
“reasonably in prospect” on March 1, 1913. The board recog­
nized that the intangible factors in the situation were important 
only as they related to earnings. The board said:
“ Primarily the earnings are the test of success of the past and the in­
dication of the future. The other statistics . . . of production, sales, etc., 
and the description of the management and its methods and plans serve to 
give depth and perspective to the earnings. . . . They are significant not 
of their own weight or force but only in their relation to earnings.”
The net earnings of the Ford Motor Company, adjusted to 









Capital-stock Valuation in Tax Cases
January, 1913, produced net earnings of $2,249,685.70, the 
largest of any month in the company’s history, over five times 
as large as earnings in the preceding January, of 1912, and 
almost ten times those of January, 1911. February, 1913, with 
$1,723,210.47, was three times as profitable a month as February, 
1912, and over four times as profitable as February, 1911. The 
experience of the company indicated that the earnings of every year 
had been more than eight times the earnings of January and Feb­
ruary combined; so if this experience were to be taken as giving a 
normal ratio, the entire year 1913 would presumably have yielded 
over $30,000,000.
The price of the Ford car had been reduced. New construction 
was about to begin and “plans were afoot for producing 200,000 
cars in the year 1913, instead of 75,000 which had been planned 
for 1912, 80,975 which had been manufactured in that year, and 
78,611 which had been sold.”
The method of valuation applied by Commissioner Roper in 
1919 was to add the profits of January and February, 1913, and 
multiply by 6, thus getting an estimate of the profits for the 
entire year. The January and February, 1913, profit figures in­
dicated a profit for 1913 of $23,837,377.02. This estimated 1913 
profit was then averaged with the actual 1912 results. The 
average for the two years amounted to $18,978,683.44, and this 
was capitalized at 10 per cent., giving a total valuation for the 
Ford Motor Company of $189,786,834.40. This figure was 
divided by 20,000, the number of shares then outstanding, which 
gave $9,489.34 as the March 1, 1913, value, as set by Commis­
sioner Roper.
It would seem to the disinterested student of capital-stock 
valuation that Commissioner Roper’s 1919 estimate was amply 
conservative. The commissioner estimated the 1913 earnings of 
the company by multiplying the January and February, 1913, 
earnings by 6, when the experience of the company clearly indi­
cated that the January and February earnings were normally 
only one eighth of the year’s total. He capitalized at 10 per cent 
the average of the 1912 and 1913 earnings without giving any 
weight to expected future growth in earnings. It is true that a 
great deal of the argument in the cases centered around the ques­
tion of how much of the growth of the Ford Motor Company after 
1913 was reasonably in prospect on March 1, 1913. It was neces­
sary that the March 1, 1913, valuation be established in the light 
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of the facts, opinions and prejudices which existed at that time, 
and not in the light of developments that had taken place since 
that date. It should be remembered that the year 1912 marked 
the culmination of the “trust busting” era. On March 1, 1913, 
there had been a change in political control in the United States 
and a special session of congress had been announced. Tariff re­
ductions were in prospect. The financial world feared radical 
legislation. War clouds were gathering in Europe. There was 
revolution in Mexico. These are all facts which have a bearing 
on the price that a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller 
for stock in the Ford Motor Company on March 1, 1913. It 
must also be remembered that on March 1, 1913, common stocks 
had not attained their present popularity as instruments of long­
term investment. It seems evident, however, that considerable 
growth of the Ford Company was indicated from the known facts. 
That there had been a tremendous growth in earnings from 1906 
to 1912, that the price of the car had been reduced, that orders 
were pouring in at an unprecedented rate, and that economies in 
production had been effected were established facts on March 1, 
1913. In view of the unquestioned dynamic factors in this situa­
tion, it appears that Commissioner Roper’s valuation was amply 
conservative.
The treasury department, however, sought on March 13, 1925, 
to assess additional taxes upon the theory that the fair value, on 
March 1, 1913, had been only $2,634 per share. The method 
used by the treasury department in this valuation was predicated 
on the theory that the average annual income, $43,500,000, for 
three years prior to the sale (1919) was to the total value at the 
time of the sale, $266,400,000, as the average annual income in the 
three years prior to 1913, $8,602,000, was to the fair market value 
of the total stock as of March 1, 1913. This developed a total 
value, as of March 1, 1913, of $52,680,000 for the 20,000 shares 
outstanding, or a value of $2,634 per share. This valuation, had 
it been upheld, would have resulted in a materially higher tax. 
It seems obvious that this three-years’-average-earnings figure 
was absolutely without significance. Consider that earnings had 
increased more than 300 per cent during this short period, and 
that another large increase for 1913 was indicated by the January 
and February results. Was there any reason to suppose that this 
three-year average represented the profit-earning ability of the 
Ford Motor Company in the years following 1913?
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Later the department relied upon still another method. By 
this method the average annual earnings for the approximate 
three-year period ending March 1, 1913, were found. From this 
figure was deducted an amount equal to 8 per cent of the con­
ceded value of the tangible assets. The remainder was considered 
as the earnings attributable to intangibles and was capitalized at 
15 per cent. This resulted in a valuation for intangibles of 
$48,438,235.67. This was added to the conceded value of the tan­
gible assets, $22,518,635.02, and the result was a valuation for the 
20,000 shares outstanding on March 1, 1913, of $70,956,870.69, or 
a value of $3,547.84 per share.
The attitude of the court and the board of tax appeals toward 
the formula-inventing activities of the department seems sound. 
The court held in the Kales case that the commissioner had no 
authority to change the March 1, 1913, valuation fixed by his 
predecessor in office unless there was evidence of fraud or mistake 
as to the facts upon which the valuation was based. No fraud or 
error as to facts was claimed by the department. The board of 
tax appeals held in the Couzens case that the commissioner had 
the authority to reopen the question of March 1, 1913, value, but 
that the commissioner was wrong in his revised valuation and 
that the fair market value of the stock of the Ford Motor Com­
pany on March 1, 1913, was $10,000 per share. The valuation 
fixed by the board, it will be noted, is very close to the $9,489.34 
valuation fixed by commissioner in 1919. After reviewing the 
earning capacity of the Ford Company and its prospects for 
future growth as they appeared on March 1, 1913, the board very 
sensibly said:
“ We are of the opinion that the fair market price of the stock owned by 
this petitioner in the Ford Motor Company on March 1, 1913, was at the 
rate of $10,000 per share. While we have not arrived at this value by the 
application of any mathematical formula, because we believe there is no 
authoritative formula available, we have given careful consideration to the 
several methods suggested in the course of the trial and have not been 
unmindful of the aid to be derived from the use of such tests.”
American courts are traditionally reluctant to set up their 
judgment of capital-stock value as superior to the judgment of a 
purchaser in good faith. In case no sales are available as a guide 
to value, however, the primary factor given consideration is that 
of future earning power.
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